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Not All Violence in Relationships Is
“Domestic Violence”
Tamara Kuennen†
INTRODUCTION
The occurrence of violence between intimate partners is
a fact.1 “Domestic violence,” however, is something different.
According to practitioners, as well as anti-domestic violence
activists and advocates, domestic violence is a pattern of acts
that may (or may not) include physical violence, perpetrated by
one person in an intimate relationship for the specific purpose of
gaining power and control over the other.2 When anti-domestic
violence activists and feminist legal academics use the term
“domestic violence,” we refer to this social construct.3
Despite this discerning construct, requiring both a
pattern and a motive, the term “domestic violence” has come to
be synonymous with a single act of physical violence in an

† Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I wish to
thank Rachel Camp, Alan Chen, Courtney Cross, Deborah Epstein, Michele Gilman,
Laurie Kohn, Chris Lasch, Jessica Miles, Natalie Nanasi, Steve Pepper, Govind Persad,
Jane Stoever, and the DU Law faculty for invaluable comments and edits, and
particularly Natalie Spiess for her diligent and thorough research assistance.
1 I acknowledge that my use of the word “fact” in an article about social
constructs might be distracting. The notion that violence is a fact rather a highly
contested construct, in and of itself, is the subject of many articles. For the purposes of
this article, I do not opine on what the term violence means but start from the premise
that it is a human activity that has been documented throughout history. What I am
interested in are how and why the public understands its existence as a social problem
at this particular juncture in time.
2 “Domestic violence (also called intimate partner violence (IPV), domestic abuse
or relationship abuse) is a pattern of behaviors used by one partner to maintain power and
control over another partner in an intimate relationship.” What Is Domestic Violence?, NAT’L
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, https://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-defined/
[https://perma.cc/7Z65-EWRW]; see also infra Part II for further discussion.
3 See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Domestic Violence Law Reform in the
Twenty-First Century: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 42 FAM. L.Q. 353, 356 (2008)
(“The core concept is the exercise of power and control . . . . ”); Edward S. Snyder & Laura
W. Morgan, Domestic Violence Ten Years Later, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 33, 33 n.2
(2004) (“‘Domestic violence’ occurs when one intimate partner uses physical violence,
threats, stalking, harassment, or emotional or financial abuse to control, manipulate,
coerce, or intimidate the other partner.”).
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intimate relationship.4 Law enters the picture because activists
have long viewed it as one of the most important tools of social
change.5 In law, one act of violence, regardless of an intimate
partner’s intent, is domestic violence.6 Neither a pattern nor a
motive is required. At the same time, many acts of coercion that
do not rise to the level of physical violence may go unrecognized
by law.7 Thus, a woman who slaps her partner once out of
exasperation theoretically could be treated more harshly by law
than a man who uses the threat of a slap to everyday intimidate
and control her. To address the mismatch between law and
construct, feminist legal scholars for years have argued for
reforms to law.8 This article argues for reform of the construct.
I draw on the methodology of sociologist Donileen Loseke.
In the late 1970s, Loseke examined the then newly named social
problem “wife abuse,” the newly identified victim of it, the
“battered woman,” and the newly created social service designed
to serve her, the “battered woman’s shelter.”9 Loseke argued that
when activists defined wife abuse as extreme rather than
ordinary, everyday violence against women, and confined the
category of battered women to only blameless women in dire
circumstances, activists transformed a previously acceptable
behavior into a serious public problem. They simultaneously,
however, perpetuated rather than challenged the cultural

4 ELLEN PENCE & SHAMITA DAS DASGUPTA, PRAXIS INT’L, RE-EXAMINING
‘BATTERING’: ARE ALL ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST INTIMATE PARTNERS THE SAME? 2
(2006) (discussing the difference between the law’s view of domestic violence, as “any
violence between partners occurring in the context of the home” and battered women’s
activists intent when they coined the terms “domestic violence” as “the space where
[battering] occurred,” battering being “a pattern of coercive control, intimidation, and
oppression that women often experienced at the hands of their male lovers and spouses”);
see also infra Part IV (discussing legal definitions of domestic violence and how these
differ from activists’ construct for domestic violence).
5 See infra Part IV.
6 See infra Section IV.A (discussing criminal definitions of domestic violence).
7 See infra Section IV.A.
8 See, e.g., A. Renée Callahan, Will the “Real” Battered Woman Please Stand Up?
In Search of a Realistic Legal Definition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER
& L. 117, 152 (1994); Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 975–76 (1995); Deborah Tuerkheimer,
Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic
Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 961–62 (2004); Julie Goldscheid, Gender
Neutrality, The “Violence Against Women” Frame, and Transformative Reform, 82 UMKC
L. REV. 623, 659 (2014); LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 40–53 (2012).
9 See generally DONILEEN R. LOSEKE, THE BATTERED WOMAN AND SHELTERS:
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WIFE ABUSE (1992); Donileen R. Loseke, Lived Realities
and the Construction of Social Problems: The Case of Wife Abuse, 10 SYMBOLIC
INTERACTION 229, 229–30 (1987) [hereinafter Lived Realities]; Donileen Loseke &
Spencer E. Cahill, The Social Construction of Deviance: Experts on Battered Women, 31
SOC. PROBS. 296 (1984).
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acceptability of “normal” violence by partners.10 This occurred
because people, such as shelter workers, tasked with determining
eligibility excluded those who did not fit. As Loseke put it: when
confronted with too many customers for too few beds, shelter
workers had to be selective; ordinary violence would not do.11
Today’s main service provider for domestic violence
victims12 is the criminal justice system.13 Feminist legal scholars
have well documented that legal decision makers (judges,
prosecutors, jurors, and police) struggle when confronted with
victims who are not blameless, passive, and entrapped by a
pattern of power and control.14 This article argues that, like the
shelter workers in Loseke’s study, legal decision makers exclude
from relief those victims who do not fit the current social
construct. As stated by Dan Kahan, they balk.15
I argue that activists’ messaging currently broadcasts,
explicitly and implicitly, that all violence in relationships is a
pattern of behaviors perpetrated for the purpose of gaining
power and control, and therefore that all violence between
10 Loseke does not judge but rather explains this process in her work. For
example, claims-makers generally use cases involving extreme conditions, and this is
understandable as “‘any use of violence’ as a social problem would likely not gain mass
public acceptance, but persons who approve of or who at least tolerate ‘normal’ violence are
still mobilized against . . . ’wife abuse.’” See Lived Realities, supra note 9, at 239. Loseke
does not argue that “the extreme acts advanced in such social problem official definitions
are absent from social life,” but rather that “[c]ases used to illustrate and define social
problems are selected from the larger populations of potentially similar cases.” Id. As
Loseke notes, “We can, of course, understand why definitions emphasizing extreme
conditions might be a necessary and sometimes unavoidable aspect of social problem
construction. Such definitions best illustrate why a condition is negative, and further, it is
only at extremes that we would expect enough social member agreement to yield successful
claims-making [of a social problem].” Id.
11 Id. at 235–36.
12 In this article, I use the term “victim” to describe a person who is experiencing
abuse in their relationship. Because this article examines anti-domestic violence activists’
construct of domestic violence, which has long relied upon a victimhood paradigm
(discussed infra Parts I and II), I use the term “victim” to describe the party in the
relationship who experiences, rather than perpetrates, a pattern of acts conducted for the
purpose of obtaining power and control over a partner. I recognize that the term “victim”
and the “victimhood paradigm” are deeply problematic. As eloquently stated by Professor
Deborah Weissman: “Although a victim’s rights are first and foremost enumerated as a
right to dignity, privacy, and to be treated with empathy and compassion, the stories of
victims have been fashioned into narratives that act to essentialize victims in ways that
are often inaccurate, demeaning, and pathologizing.” Deborah M. Weissman, The
Community Politics of Domestic Violence, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1479, 1495 (2017).
13 See GOODMARK, supra note 8, at 18–25 (providing an overview of law and
policy reform, and criticizing anti-domestic violence activists for their over-reliance on
the criminal justice system as the primary solution to the problem of domestic violence
in the United States today).
14 Id. at 64 (discussing the paradigmatic victim, who is “expected to cooperate
with the legal system—with police who want to arrest and prosecutors who want to
convict her abuser”); see also id. (“By all accounts, the paradigmatic victim comports with
societal notions of the ‘victim.’”).
15 My argument draws on the work of Dan Kahan. See infra Section IV.B.
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parties is “domestic violence.” Activists should do the opposite.
We should be explicit that not all violence in relationships is a
pattern of acts perpetrated for the purpose of power and control.
Rather, some is, and we want to target that particular type of
violence because it is most psychologically damaging to women16
and other marginalized groups, and it is the type that exploits
gender and other privilege.17 We could then refocus on this
gendered violence that is used for, and results in, the
subordination of people based on their gender. Finally, being
explicit that our current construct is a subtype, rather than the
only type, of relationship violence would diminish backlash by
legal decision makers and victim blaming by the public.
The concern over the subset of relationship partner
violence called “coercively controlling” violence by social scientists
and “domestic violence” by anti-domestic violence advocates and
activists is well-placed. In this article I argue merely that the
construct would better serve the social change goal of ending this
particular type of violence if we were careful not to overstate its
prevalence and over-generalize its consequences.
More broadly, viewing “domestic violence” as a social
construct makes room for examining what about the construct is
true versus what is wrongly taken for true, and reminds us that,
as with other social constructs, such as gender, we have come to
believe certain attributes about and expect certain behaviors of
the “domestic violence victim.” These include that she is
biologically and performatively female and heterosexual,18 and
that she is “entrapped,” meaning that the relationship dynamic of
male power and control (that is unique to the construct) is such
that the domestic violence victim is unable to escape the abusive

16 It is also damaging to men in intimate relationships, when male or female
partners perpetrate coercive control. See Denise A. Hines & Emily M. Douglas, Sexual
Aggression Experiences Among Male Victims of Physical Partner Violence: Prevalence,
Severity, and Health Correlates for Male Victims and Their Children, 45 ARCHIVES
SEXUAL BEHAV. 1133, 1134 (2016); see also infra Section III.A.
17 As stated by Evan Stark, whose work is discussed infra Section III.A.,
“Coercive control is most prevalent and has its most devastating consequences in
heterosexual relationships where it is ‘gendered’ in its aim (male privilege) and its object
(female subordination) by its link to structural inequalities in the larger economy. But
the process of coercive control is not per se gender specific, need not be legally specified
as such, and may play off a host of vulnerabilities, including those associated with race,
sexual orientation, sexual identity, age or immigration status that have been socially
marginalized.” Evan Stark, The “Coercive Control Framework:” Making Law Work for
Women, in CRIMINALISING NON-PHYSICAL FAMILY VIOLENCE: COERCIVE CONTROL AND
AUTONOMY CRIMES (forthcoming Springer Int’l, Brisbane, Austl., 2020) (Manuscript on
file with author).
18 See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 8, at 623 (arguing that the current “womanspecific frame” reinforces gender and sexual orientation binaries).
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relationship.19 By being entrapped, she is deserving of help to
escape. Conversely, when she does not fall within the construct,
we deem her undeserving of help.20 The beauty of constructs is
that they are malleable, and we may change them when we get
them wrong. I conclude that if the messaging about our current
construct remains unchanged, there must be a significant
downward shift in what the law can be expected to accomplish.
The article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes in more
detail the work of Donileen Loseke, and Part II applies her
methodology by taking stock of the constructs as they currently
exist. Part III examines social science data available since Loseke
published her study, demonstrating that the current construct
reflects, in reality, only a subset of relationship violence and a
subset of the people who experience it. Part IV examines whether
the main service designed to help people experiencing
relationship violence today—law—perpetuates, rather than
challenges norms. I argue that it does the former, because legal
decision makers, like the shelter workers in Loseke’s study,
exclude from the social community of domestic violence victims
those who do not fit the construct. This Part suggests changing
the construct to explicitly reflect that not all violence in
relationships is “domestic violence,” and suggests proposed
reforms to the law of domestic violence through this lens.
I.

THE HISTORICAL SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF “WIFE
ABUSE” AND THE “BATTERED WOMAN”

A number of scholars have persuasively argued that the
problem of domestic violence has not been adequately “framed”21 or
“constructed,”22 and many within this strand acknowledge explicitly
that domestic violence is “socially constructed.”23 Sociologist
19 Tamara L. Kuennen, Love Matters, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 1010 (2014) (“[W]hen
we fail to discern coercive control from other forms of [intimate partner violence] . . . . we
inadvertently imply not only that all women who experience [intimate partner
violence] . . . are entrapped in their relationships. This is particularly problematic because of
the connotations of the word ‘entrapment.’”).
20 See Lived Realities, supra note 9, at 235–36 (explaining problems, such as
denial of social services, when a victim appears to bear some responsibility for the
violence rather than appearing as a “pure” or guiltless victim).
21 See Goldscheid, supra note 8, at 626.
22 See Weissman, supra note 12, at 1500.
23 See, e.g., Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights Remedies for Battered Women:
Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 L. & INEQ. 1, 21 (1993) (stating without further explanation that
“the social and legal constructs [of marriage and battered women], combined with lack of
state enforcement of the theoretical social compact, reinforce and perpetuate the
inequalities in the abusive marriage and fail to allow battered women adequate
opportunity to fulfill their human or civil rights to safety of their person, liberty and life
itself”); Bethany A. Corbin, Goodbye Earl: Domestic Abusers and Guns in the Wake of
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Donileen Loseke was among the first. Based on data gathered in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, she thoroughly documented the
existence of two overlapping, though not coextensive social
constructs: “wife abuse,” and the “battered woman.”24 She argued
that the primary service designed to help battered women at that
time was shelter, and that shelters reproduced rather than
challenged the then existing construct of battered women.25
Social constructionism proposes that the world and
everything in it exists because we as human beings agree that
they do.26 According to this school of thought, the existence of
objects is not contingent upon their material or biological
constituency; their existence is contingent upon the social
process of defining them.27 We perceive objects; our perceptions
enter an intra- and inter-personal communicative space; a series
of communicative acts occurs; the object then exists in a social
context and has meaning. Thus “[m]eaning and our perceptions
of ‘reality’ are socially constructed . . . . Through this process we
define objects, enabling them to exist in a social context.”28

United States v. Castleman—Can the Supreme Court Save Domestic Violence Victims?, 94
NEB. L. REV. 101, 108 (2015) (stating that “[t]he characterization and interpretation of
domestic violence alters with the changing social constructs, and denotes a spectrum of
behaviors committed by intimate partners”); Julie Goldscheid, Gender Violence and Work
in the United States and South Africa: The Parallel Processes of Legal and Cultural Change,
19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 921, 953 (2011) (“Instead of framing the problem as a
social construct reflecting gender bias, domestic and sexual violence often is framed in
terms of personal dynamics of relationship.”); Vanessa E. Munro, Violence Against Women,
‘Victimhood’ and the (Neo)Liberal State, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 233, 233 (Margaret Davies & Vanessa E. Munro eds., 2013) (“But
despite its importance within feminist theorizing, the meaning and parameters of the
concept of ‘violence’ are malleable and fluctuating; though grounded in a very real
experience of harm or wrongdoing, they are heavily socially constructed, relating in
complex and mutually-affirming ways to observers’ normative responses.”); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in
Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 522, 567 (1992) (making repeated references
to domestic violence or battered women as being socially constructed without explaining
these conclusions); Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of Change
Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 328 (2011)
(arguing “[t]he survivor struggles to understand the problem [of domestic violence],
including its cause and potential solutions, but may resist self-identifying as ‘abused’ or
defining the situation as domestic violence based on social constructs”); Daniel P.
Whitmore, Note, Enforcing the Equal Protection Clause on Behalf of Domestic Violence
Victims: The Impact of Doe v. Calumet City, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 123, 159 (1995) (referring
to domestic violence as a social construct and examining how the response to “domestic
violence has been conditioned through our culture, particularly our legal culture”).
24 See LOSEKE, supra note 9, at 13–14 (explaining first data examined was from 1974).
25 Id. at 158–59 (“In brief, social problems work in this instance does not
challenge cultural interpretations surrounding the moral evaluation of violence and
people. Indeed, it confirms these interpretations.”).
26 KENNETH J. GERGEN, AN INVITATION TO SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 2 (3d. ed. 2015).
27 Shaughan A. Keaton & Graham D. Bodie, Explaining Social Constructivism,
25 COMM. TCHR. 192, 195 (2011).
28 Id.
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Loseke describes her analysis as one that “lies in the social
construction tradition of the study of public problems. In this
tradition, social problems . . . are not assumed to be mirrors or
reflections of objective conditions. They rather are understood to
be the results of human activity.”29 In the 1980s, Loseke worked
in a shelter for battered women as she completed her graduate
studies. She was curious about whether wife abuse, a historic
social norm recently garnering the status of a social problem, and
the battered woman as “a collective representation for a woman
with a particular type of experience, biography, motivation, and
subjectivity,” were served by the primary social service that the
movement designed: the battered women’s shelter.30
Loseke set about the task of documenting wife abuse and
the battered woman by first proving the existence of the
constructs. In addition to her observations of workers at a shelter,
she used “academic [ ] articles, transcripts of public policy
hearings, and mass media magazine articles” as her texts.31 She
examined both the explicit and implicit messages of battered
women’s activist organizations, which she calls “claims-makers.”32
With numerous pages of examples, Loseke convincingly
demonstrated that the social construct of wife abuse is “a label for
severe, frequent, and continuing violence that escalates over time
and is unstoppable. Such violence is that in which unrepentant
men intentionally harm women and where women are not the
authors of their own experiences which they find terrifying.”33
Loseke observed that the construct, created by activists
and advocates for abused women, raises a central fundamental
question: why is it necessary for such violence to be repeated?34
Is not one act of violence enough? Not according to activists and
advocates in the late 1970s: “Most certainly, no claims-maker
argues that one act of violence is acceptable, but it remains that
in their emphases and explicit definitions, wife abuse is about
continuing, escalating, and unstoppable victimization.”35
For this construct to gain traction as a social problem, it
had to be different from “normal” violence occurring in
relationships.36 It had to happen more than once and it also had
to be serious enough in nature to be accepted by the public as a

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

See LOSEKE, supra note 9, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 19 (emphases in original).
Id. at 18–21.
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real problem.37 As a result, claims-makers argued that the goal
of public and social service policy should be to “help the battered
woman leave the situation” and “terminate the relationship.”38
Loseke notes that the requirement for violence to be
repeated might have been interpreted to be a question about
“[w]hy such a man persists in [the] despicable behavior,” but
both the public and the claims-makers transformed this
question into one about women victims: “Why do they stay?”39
Loseke observes that the question is reasonable, given the
framing of the problem:
After all, by definition, women victims are terrified of their abuse,
which is extreme and repeated and consequential and only grows
worse over time. Since the prognosis that a man will change is poor,
it is justified for claims-makers to label a woman’s hope for such
change as a “false and futile dream.” The collective representation of
wife abuse leads to the common sense conclusion that a woman should
leave [her] relationship, and this prescription is a part of the collective
representation: A woman experiencing wife abuse must leave her
relationship . . . . In the process of accounting for a woman’s behavior
of staying in a relationship containing wife abuse, claims construct a
new type of person—a “battered woman”—a woman whose
unexpectable behavior of staying in a relationship containing wife
abuse supports rather than challenges claims about the content of this
public problem.40

Thusly sprung the social construct of the “battered
woman.” Key to this construct is that the woman is entrapped.
She must be trapped, Loseke argues, because her behavior of
staying must be defined as unreasonable for the extreme conduct
known as wife abuse to remain unchallenged.41 The most
common reason for her entrapment is economic dependency,
followed very closely by additional factors such as having no
place else to go, being isolated, feeling embarrassed, and being
unable to rely upon mainstream agencies other than shelters.42
Loseke’s analysis focuses on the question of whether the
service that claims-makers fought for—shelters—accomplished
one of the goals that activists desired: to challenge cultural
beliefs about both the acceptability of violence against women by
their partners, as well as the moral evaluation of battered
women as blameworthy for their own victimization. In other
37 Id. at 18–19. Amongst other sources, Loseke cites the testimony of renowned
activists Marjorie Fields and Marta Segovia-Ashley at 1978 public policy hearings before
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Id. at 21 n.30.
38 Id. at 21.
39 Id. at 20.
40 Id. at 20–21 (emphasis in original).
41 Id. at 22.
42 Id. at 22–23.
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words, their goal was to raise consciousness of the societal
problems and inequities posed by intimate partner violence.
What she found was that rather than challenging these cultural
beliefs, shelters instead reproduced the constructs. When
confronted with too many customers and too few beds, workers
denied entry to women who experienced violence that was not
sufficiently severe, escalating, and unstoppable.43 Similarly,
when workers found that the woman was somehow at fault, such
as when she was the first aggressor, they again denied entry.44
Only “battered women,” as the construct defined them, became
part of the social community.45 Hence, the reproduction of the
socially constructed problem: only women suffering severe,
escalating, and unstoppable violence who were not at fault for
this violence and who were willing to terminate their
relationships could become members of the social community of
“battered women.” The role of shelters became that of changing
women’s subjective definitions so that they conformed to the
socially constructed reality, rather than changing reality.46
II.

CURRENT CONSTRUCTIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES

Replicating Loseke’s methodology, my inquiry now turns
to the current construction of public images of domestic violence
and domestic violence victims. What is the construct put forward
today? As Loseke would put it, what must be subjectively
apprehended about an individual in order to classify them as a
victim of domestic violence?47

See Lived Realities, supra note 9, at 235–36.
Id.
45 See LOSEKE, supra note 9, at 155 (discussing how only some women achieve
official inclusion into the battered woman social community).
46 Id. at 165 (“The experiences and characteristics of women residing in [shelters]—
supported, of course, by the understandings of social service providers assisting these
women—become the evidence supporting the social construction of wife abuse as severe,
repeated, unstoppable behavior; they are the evidence supporting the construction of the
battered woman as a pure victim who is unable to act on her own behalf; they are the evidence
justifying the correctness of shelter organizations. In turn, the work in [shelters] reproduces
the cultural belief that only some violence is morally intolerable and that only some victimized
women deserve public sympathy.”).
47 Id. at 3–4 (“What must be subjectively apprehended about an individual
experience in order to classify it as one of ‘wife abuse?’”).
43
44
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It’s All About “Power and Control”
1. Messages Sent by Anti-Domestic Violence
Organizations

Claims-makers’ public messaging about intimate partner
violence plays an important role in contemporary social
constructions of domestic violence. Most of the national, wellrecognized anti-domestic violence organizations promote the
following definition of domestic violence: an abusive partner’s
desire to exert power and control over their partner. In a Google
search of the words “domestic violence,” the first site to pop up is
The National Domestic Violence Hotline (The Hotline) website,
which answers the question “Why do people abuse?” as follows:
Domestic violence and abuse stem from a desire to gain and maintain
power and control over an intimate partner. Abusive people believe
they have the right to control and restrict their partners, and they
may enjoy the feeling that exerting power gives them. They often
believe that their own feelings and needs should be the priority in
their relationships, so they use abusive tactics to dismantle equality
and make their partners feel less valuable and deserving of respect in
the relationship.48

The Hotline’s definition of abuse states: “Domestic
violence (also called intimate partner violence (IPV), domestic
abuse or relationship abuse) is a pattern of behaviors used by
one partner to maintain power and control over another partner
in an intimate relationship.”49 Next to it is an image of a wheel
with spokes, a center and a rim (Power and Control Wheel). In
the center are the words “power and control”; at the rim are the
words physical and sexual violence.50 In the eight spokes that lie
between the rim and the center of the wheel are behaviors,
including but not limited to: using intimidation, using male
privilege, minimizing, denying and blaming.51 The Hotline says
of this image: “Think of the wheel as a diagram of the tactics an
abusive partner uses to keep their victim in the relationship.
While the inside of the wheel is comprised of subtle, continual
behaviors, the outer ring represents physical, visible violence.”52
The theory underlying the Power and Control Wheel is the
predominant way that advocates working on behalf of victims in
48 Why Do People Abuse?, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, http://www.thehot
line.org/is-this-abuse/why-do-people-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/SBK7-5KDZ].
49 See What Is Domestic Violence?, supra note 2.
50 Id.
51 Id. The other five spokes include using emotional abuse, using isolation, using
children, using economic abuse, and coercion and threats. Id.
52 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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the field of domestic violence understand violence between
intimate partners.53 It is also known as the Duluth Model, because
it was developed by staff of the Domestic Abuse Intervention
Project in Duluth, Minnesota. A bit of history from the Domestic
Violence Intervention Program’s (DVIP) webpage explains:
In 1984, staff at the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project (DAIP)
began developing curricula for groups for men who batter and victims
of domestic violence. We wanted a way to describe battering for
victims, offenders, practitioners in the criminal justice system and the
general public. Over several months, we convened focus groups of
women who had been battered. We listened to heart-wrenching stories
of violence, terror and survival. After listening to these stories and
asking questions, we documented the most common abusive behaviors
or tactics that were used against these women. The tactics chosen for
the wheel were those that were most universally experienced by
battered women.54

The DVIP notes on this same webpage how prevalent and
extensive use of the Power and Control Wheel is, noting that it
has been seen by “millions” across various media.55
The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence
(NCADV) similarly states: “Violence in relationships occurs
when one person feels entitled to power and control over their
partner and chooses to use abuse to gain and maintain that
control.”56 Both the Domestic Violence Awareness Project and
the National Network to End Domestic Violence similarly define
domestic violence as a pattern of controlling behaviors used by
abusers to gain power in a relationship.57 Indeed, the most
prominent anti-domestic violence agencies promote the theme of
the Power and Control Wheel.
53 Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of
Intimate Partner Violence: Research Update and Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM.
CT. REV. 476, 478 (2008) (describing the power and control wheel as the “model that is
used extensively in women’s shelters and support groups” and noting that “[m]any
women’s advocates use the term domestic violence for this pattern”).
54 FAQs About the Wheels, DOMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, https
://www.theduluthmodel.org/wheels/faqs-about-the-wheels/ [https://perma.cc/2ARZ-CQFU].
55 Id. (“The wheel is used in many settings and can be found in manuals, books,
articles, and on the walls of agencies that seek to prevent domestic violence. It has even
been seen by millions on national television shows and soap operas!”).
56 Dynamics of Abuse, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://
ncadv.org/dynamics-of-abuse [https://perma.cc/Y9CJ-WPLR].
57 See About DV, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AWARENESS PROJECT, https://www.dvaware
ness.org/about-dv [https://perma.cc/X5UU-WBN2] (“Domestic violence is best understood as a
pattern of abusive behaviors—including physical, sexual, and psychological attacks as well as
economic coercion—used by one intimate partner against another (adult or adolescent) to gain,
maintain, or regain power and control in the relationship.”); What is DV?, NAT’L NETWORK TO
END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://nnedv.org/about-dv/what-is-dv/ [https://perma.cc/6CQJ-ES
PG] (“Domestic violence is a pattern of coercive, controlling behavior that can include physical
abuse, emotional or psychological abuse, sexual abuse, or financial abuse (using money and
financial tools to exert control).”).
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Public service announcements (PSA) seeking to raise
awareness about domestic violence are a common tool of nonprofits, private foundations, and even recently of men’s
professional sports leagues.58 These, too, operate on the premise
that domestic violence is about an abuser exerting power and
control over a victim. The National Football League’s (NFL)
2015 Super Bowl PSA depicted a terrified woman pretending to
order a pizza from a 911 operator in order to escape her abusive
relationship.59 The Allstate Foundation’s PSA for their Purple
Purse campaign depicted a female victim of domestic violence as
being trapped in a literal jail cell.60 These messages perpetuated
by large organizations and anti-domestic violence groups have,
understandably, informed the public’s opinion and perception of
victims, abusers, and partner violence.
2. Public Opinion
Further underscoring presently prevailing constructions of
domestic violence, several studies have specifically questioned
survey participants on their thoughts about power and control
within abusive relationships. For example, a 2005 study by
professors at SUNY Albany found that many respondents
considered an abuser’s anger and loss of control as one of the chief
reasons for domestic violence.61 Another 2005 study by the Allstate
Foundation asked participants to define domestic violence in their
own words, and several of the respondents defined domestic
violence as being about power and control.62 Similarly, in a 1997
Family Violence Prevention Fund study, survey participants most

58 For a recent discussion of men’s professional sports’ public ad campaigns,
see Chelsea Augelli & Tamara Kuennen, Domestic Violence & Men’s Professional Sports:
Advancing the Ball, 21 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 27 (2018).
59 Wall Street J., Super Bowl 2015: Domestic Violence PSA, YOUTUBE (Jan. 27,
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Z_zWIVRIWk [https://perma.cc/98WW-ML77]
[hereinafter Domestic Violence PSA].
60 The Allstate Foundation, The Allstate Foundation Launches “America’s
Largest Prison Break” to Free Women Trapped by Domestic Violence, PR NEWSWIRE (June
14, 2016, 10:28 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-allstate-foundationlaunches-americas-largest-prison-break-to-free-women-trapped-by-domestic-violence300284333.html [https://perma.cc/HHX8-X2QN].
61 Alissa Pollitz Worden & Bonnie E. Carlson, Attitudes and Beliefs About Domestic
Violence: Results of a Public Opinion Survey, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1219, 1226 (2005).
62 ALLSTATE FOUND., FIRST ANNUAL ALLSTATE FOUNDATION NATIONAL POLL ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2006), http://www.ncdsv.org/images/1stAnnual
AllstateNationalPollDVExecSum.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQ4D-RZ7E] (“It’s a power grab by one
over the other . . . . I’m a victim of domestic violence and it’s the worst thing . . . . Sometimes the
people don’t believe you and that’s why a lot of women are scared to go to the police. You go back
and continue to be a victim because it’s better than trying to get people to help you . . . . ”).
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frequently mentioned “the husband’s need to control the wife and
get his way”63 as a cause of domestic violence.
Modern social media public outreach trends emphasize the
findings of these studies. In 2014, following the Ray Rice incident,
victims of domestic violence began using “#WhyIStayed” to explain
why they stayed in abusive relationships.64 One central theme
throughout many of these tweets was that the victims felt trapped
and unable to escape their partner’s abuse.65
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the average person
thinks that domestic violence is about a male abuser exerting
power and control over a trapped female victim. In 2017, a New
York City domestic violence shelter asked its followers on social
media to list the words that came to mind when they thought
about domestic violence.66 Two of the words that came to mind
the most were “power” and “women.”67
Interestingly, there is also data indicating that the
average person does not hold victims of violence blameless. In a
Georgia State University study, researchers found that about
51% of those surveyed believed that it was “difficult to understand
why victims stay in violent relationships,” indicating that at least
a sizeable chunk of those who participated in this study did not
think that domestic violence was totally inescapable.68 And the
2005 SUNY Albany study also found that nearly one in four of
those surveyed “agreed that some women want to be abused,” and
that “nearly two thirds believed that women [could] exit violent
relationships ‘if they really wanted to.’”69 A 2002 National
Criminal Justice Reference Service study likely put it best when
it stated, “[f]or the most part, the public does not blame female
victims for abuse, although they [do] hold women accountable for
63 Bonnie E. Carlson & Alissa Pollitz Worden, Public Opinion About Domestic
Violence 9 (Nat’l Inst. Just., Working Paper No. 198319, 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles
1/nij/grants/198319.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5HE-F2C9].
64 See Olga Khazan, Why They Stayed, ATLANTIC (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.the
atlantic.com/health/archive/2014/09/why-they-stayed/379843/ [https://perma.cc/U8CY-AC9G].
65 See id. (“I had to plan my escape for months before I even had a place to go and
money for the bus to get there.”(emphasis added)); Jared Keller, 19 #WhyIStayed Tweets that
Everyone Needs to See, MIC (Sept. 8, 2014), https://mic.com/articles/98326/19-why-istayedtweets-that-everyone-needs-to-see#.I8P5hDlmE [https://perma.cc/7FYU-DUUQ]. For more
#WhyIStayed tweets, see #WhyIStayed, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/hashtag/WhyIStayed?
src=hash [https://perma.cc/8ERK-G844].
66 URINYC, What Words Come to Mind When You Think of Domestic Violence?,
MEDIUM (Dec. 7, 2017), https://medium.com/unshelteredvoices/what-words-come-to-mindwhen-you-think-of-domestic-violence-61c6aa75f7bb [https://perma.cc/6RPY-XSTE].
67 Id. Other words that came to mind the most for those who responded to the
shelter’s request included anger, children, abuse, dangerous, and pain. Id.
68 Christina Policastro & Brian K. Payne, The Blameworthy Victim: Domestic
Violence Myths and the Criminalization of Victimhood, J. AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT
& TRAUMA 329, 337–38 (2013).
69 See Worden & Carlson, supra note 61, at 1229.
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exiting abusive relationships.”70 Such beliefs are informed by the
concept that leaving the abuser is the only rational action victims
of domestic violence can take.
B.

Victims Want (or Should Want) to Leave, But Cannot

As the section below demonstrates, many believe that
domestic violence victims want to, need to, or should end their
relationships. Although this belief is occasionally qualified with
comments like “when she’s ready” or “when she decides to leave,”
the construct stresses that leaving is the only rational solution.
1. Messages Sent by Anti-Domestic Violence
Organizations
Anti-domestic violence organizations—both local and
national—attempt to make it clear to victims and their
supporters that leaving an abusive relationship is hard. But
most of these organizations either imply or overtly stress that
the victim wants or needs to leave. The organization Break the
Silence Against Domestic Violence advances this construct quite
aggressively by highlighting an article titled Why Staying in an
Abusive Relationship is Worse than Leaving on their website.71
This article emphasizes the emotional, spiritual, physical, and
financial damage that staying in an abusive relationship can do,
and concludes with the advice that while “leaving gives you an
opportunity to reclaim and rebuild your life, [s]taying only
prolongs your suffering with escalation of abuse over time.”72
Other organizations encourage domestic violence victims to
leave in a less aggressive manner. For example, Safe Horizon’s
webpage on domestic violence starts with the tagline “Afraid to stay,
afraid to leave?” and then proceeds to encourage those in abusive
relationships to find the help they need to leave their abusers.73
Similarly, New Hope for Women, a Maine-based domestic violence
organization, focuses their entire “Safety Plan” webpage on the steps

See Carlson & Worden, supra note 63.
Amy Thomson, Why Staying in an Abusive Relationship is Worse than
Leaving, BTSDAV (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.breakthesilencedv.org/staying-abusiverelationship-worse-leaving/ [https://perma.cc/5WWF-8ZBS].
72 Id.; see also Sydney Martin, Eliminate that Seven Times Statistic, How to Stay
Away For Good, BTSDAV (JAN. 15, 2017), https://www.breakthesilencedv.org/beat-thatseven-times-statistic/ [https://perma.cc/M3RW-SVKH] (“[E]ven though a survivor returns
to their abuser an average of seven times before leaving for good, we hope that these tips
can help you find ways to overcome obstacles and say goodbye to your abuser forever.”).
73 Domestic Violence, SAFEHORIZON, https://www.safehorizon.org/get-help/domesticviolence/—overview/ [https://perma.cc/3L4F-TEWF].
70
71
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that a victim should take to leave the relationship.74 Healing Abuse
Working for Change (HAWC), a Massachusetts-based domestic
violence organization makes it clear that leaving should be a
domestic violence victim’s ultimate goal:
Leaving an abusive relationship means gradually recognizing that
you are in control of your life, no matter what. The first step . . . is
acknowledging a need for help. Whether you want to discuss this issue
and make a plan, or you seek an immediate emergency shelter, HAWC
is ready to help.75

The NCADV states that there are “many reasons victims
of domestic violence . . . choose to stay in abusive relationships,”
but it stresses that the decision stems from a variety of forces
working against the victim (e.g., lack of money, unsupportive
family and friends, nowhere else to go, pets they do not want to
leave behind, etc.) beyond their control, and not from the victim’s
desire to preserve her relationship.76 The National Network to
End Domestic Violence does the same.77 These messages, which
are disseminated by groups on the front lines of domestic
violence education and prevention and which demand that the
victim terminate their abusive relationship in order to end the
cycle of abuse against them, serve to enshrine the construct’s
sole solution to the societal problem of domestic violence.
2. Messages Sent by Government Agencies
More so than anti-domestic violence organizations,
national, state, and local government agencies overtly tell
victims that they must leave their abusive relationships. King
County in Washington State remarks on their domestic violence
webpage, in large bold letters, “There’s No Excuse. Don’t wait
until you and the ones you love get hurt.”78 King County also
uses victim’s children in their messaging, warning that victims
who stay put their children at risk of abuse.79 The Clark County’s
74 Safety Plan, NEW HOPE FOR WOMEN, https://newhopeforwomen.org/safety-plan
[https://perma.cc/77SZ-SDEP].
75 Why Leaving is Hard, HEALING ABUSE WORKING FOR CHANGE, https://hawcdv.org/
get-help-now/about-domestic-violence/why-leaving-is-hard/ [https://perma.cc/4PCZ-LZTN].
76 See Dynamics of Abuse, supra note 56.
77 Frequently Asked Questions About Domestic Violence, NAT’L NETWORK TO END
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://nnedv.org/content/frequently-asked-questions-about-domesticviolence/ [https://perma.cc/47UZ-Z59B](explaining that victims of domestic violence largely
stay because they’re trapped, not because they want to). But see id. (“Survivors often report
that they want the abuse to end, not the relationship. A survivor may stay with or return to
an abusive partner because they believe the abuser’s promises to change.”).
78 Domestic Violence, KING COUNTY, https://www.kingcounty.gov/depts/prosecutor/
victim-community-support/domestic-violence.aspx [https://perma.cc/BC89-GJTE].
79 Id.

58

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

Prosecuting Attorney publishes guidance to victims of domestic
violence, which essentially boils down to this: if you’re a victim
of domestic violence, you need to leave.80 The State of Nebraska
does acknowledge that some victims will decide to stay,81 but
later also proceeds to explain why staying is not the best idea.82
And the City of Kingsport, Tennessee also makes it explicit that
victims need to leave their abusive relationships stating,
“DON’T BE A VICTIM” and “TAKE A STAND.”83
Although the U.S. Department of Health & Human
Services states that it’s “best to let [the victim] decide [whether]
to stay, leave or seek help,” the Department also remarks that “[i]f
a friend or loved one is being abused, it is important to help them
get out of the relationship and get to safety.”84 And while the
federal Office on Women’s Health also does not explicitly tell
victims to leave their abusers, it does hint that the victim should
consider leaving, remarking that “[y]ou do not have to leave today
or do it all at once. But a safety plan can help you know what to
do when you are ready to leave. Having a plan in place can help
you get out safely later if you do decide to leave.”85 These messages
from government agencies, when viewed with the messages from
anti-domestic violence organizations, reinforce society’s notion
that the only way to end intimate partner violence is for the victim
to leave the relationship. By staying, the notion continues, the
victim continues the cycle of violence against them.
C.

Victims Who Do Not Leave are Entrapped

In cases where domestic violence victims choose not to
end a relationship, anti-domestic violence advocates and
activists argue that the failure to leave is because the victim is
80 What to Do If You Are a Victim of Domestic Violence, CLARK COUNTY PROSECUTING
ATT’Y, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/domviol/domvic.htm [https://perma.cc/R5JP-CJLZ].
81 NEB. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BREAKING THE SILENCE: A HANDBOOK
FOR SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1, http://dhhs.ne.gov/children_family_services/Docum
ents/BreakingtheSilenceBooklet.pdf (“Identifying your partner as an abuser does not mean that
you are to blame for what is happening in any way, regardless if you stay in the relationship or
if you leave. Sometimes staying in the relationship is the safest option at the moment. Identifying
that you are being abused does not mean that you should automatically leave.”).
82 Id. at 13.
83 Domestic Violence, CITY OF KINGSPORT, TENN., https://www.kingsporttn.gov/cityservices/police-department/operations_bureau/criminal_investigation/investigations/domestic_
violence/ [https://perma.cc/W9C6-ZNUP] (emphasis in original).
84 Tips for Helping a Loved One or Friend Get Out of an Abusive Relationship, U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: FED. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH, https://foh.psc.gov/NYCU/dome
sticviolence2.asp [https://perma.cc/6FTA-5EUD].
85 Leaving an Abusive Relationship, OFF. ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, https://www.
womenshealth.gov/relationships-and-safety/domestic-violence/leaving-abusive-relationship
[https://perma.cc/GC5W-W576].

2020]

"DOMESTIC VIOLENCE"

59

trapped, and never because the victim chooses to stay in the
relationship. The notion that victims, like people in non-abusive
relationships, might feel conflicted about ending their intimate
partnerships is largely ignored.
1. Anti-Domestic Violence Organizations
More so than other sources, anti-domestic violence
organizations acknowledge love as a reason for why domestic
violence victims choose to stay with their abusers. The Hotline, the
NCADV, and the National Network to End Domestic Violence all
cite love as one of the reasons that domestic violence victims stay.86
The Hotline states that “[s]o often, the victim feels love for their
abusive partner. They may have children with them and want to
maintain their family . . . . They may only want the violence to stop,
not for the relationship to end entirely.”87 Similarly, the NCADV
remarks that a victim might stay because “the relationship is a mix
of good times, love[,] and hope along with the manipulation,
intimidation[,] and fear.”88 And the National Network to End
Domestic Violence similarly recognizes that survivors may simply
want the violence to stop, not the relationship to end.89
However, at the same time, all three of these organizations
also state that victims of domestic violence stay in relationships
because they are trapped.90 And, these organizations dedicate
substantially more space on their websites to explaining that
victims of domestic violence stay because they are trapped than
they do to explaining that victims stay because they love their
partners and want to stay in the relationships.91 These
organizations’ failure to fully recognize that the victim may in fact
86 See Frequently Asked Questions About Domestic Violence, supra note 77; Why Do
People Stay in Abusive Relationships?, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, http://www.
thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/why-do-people-stay-in-abusive-relationships/ [https://perma.cc/A
936-DJZQ]; Why Do Victims Stay?, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://
ncadv.org/why-do-victims-stay [https://perma.cc/7DVX-8JQH].
87 See Why Do People Stay in Abusive Relationships?, supra note 86.
88 See Why Do Victims Stay?, supra note 86.
89 See Frequently Asked Questions About Domestic Violence, supra note 77.
90 See id. (asserting that victims stay because they’re afraid of their partners,
they think the abuse is their fault, and they don’t think they can survive on their own);
Why Do People Stay in Abusive Relationships?, supra note 86 (citing fear, language
barriers, and lack of money or resources as additional reasons why domestic violence
victims remain with their abusers); Why Do Victims Stay?, supra note 86 (“A victim’s
reasons for staying with their abusers are extremely complex and, in most cases, are
based on the reality that their abuser will follow through with the threats they have used
to keep them trapped: the abuser will hurt or kill them, they will hurt or kill the kids,
they will win custody of the children, they will harm or kill pets or others, they will ruin
their victim financially . . . . ”).
91 See Frequently Asked Questions About Domestic Violence, supra note 77; Why Do
People Stay in Abusive Relationships?, supra note 86; Why Do Victims Stay?, supra note 86.
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be making the choice to stay in an abusive relationship for reasons
other than feeling trapped perpetuates society’s current construct
of the “entrapped victim.”
2. Empirical Data
Studies about domestic violence often assert that victims
of domestic violence remain in their abusive relationships because
they are trapped. A 2013 study by professors at the University of
Alabama noted the following:
Perhaps the best way to decrease the number of abusive relationships
is by educating women before they find themselves trapped in one. If
more women knew about the factors—including social influence, the
scientific study of the influence of external factors on individuals’
attitudes and behavior—that may lead one to become trapped in a
violent relationship by their own consistency, they would be able to
avoid such factors and place themselves in positions that are not
favorable to abuse.92

Additionally, in a 1996 book that looked at the psychology
of domestic violence victims through interviews with abused
women, the author found that many of the victims surveyed chose
to stay in their abusive relationships because they were trapped
by everything from the stigma of divorce, to the feeling that they
could not survive on their own, to simple fear of their abuser.93
And, more recently, in a 2009 article about why victims stay, the
authors noted that domestic violence victims remained in abusive
relationships because they were trapped by a myriad of things,
including financial dependency, a complicated legal system, and
ineffective police assistance.94
Some studies conclude that love is one of the reasons why
victims of violence stay. For example, a 2000 study about domestic
violence victims explicitly noted that some victims do stay with
their abuser because of love and concluded that a woman’s
decision to stay because of that love was a legitimate choice that
she was free to make and one that should be supported.95 This
study also highlighted the importance of recognizing the small
degree of free choice that domestic violence victims have and
92 Brandon Dare et al., Commitment: The Key to Women Staying in Abusive
Relationships, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL REL., INTERGROUP REL. & IDENTITY 58, 63 (2013)
(emphasis added).
93 VALERIE NASH CHANG, I JUST LOST MYSELF: PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE OF WOMEN
IN MARRIAGE 102–03, 106 (1996).
94 Darrell Payne & Linda Wermeling, Domestic Violence and the Female Victim: The
Real Reason Women Stay!, 3 J. MULTICULTURAL, GENDER, & MINORITY STUD. 1, 2–3 (2009).
95 See Einat Peled et al., Choice and Empowerment for Battered Women Who
Stay: Toward a Constructivist Model, 45 SOC. WORK 9, 11, 15 (2000).
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noted that that choice “may be an integral part of an
empowerment-based feminist perspective advocating support of
women’s strengths, autonomy, and control over their lives in the
context of multiple constraints and despite them.”96
Similarly, a 2003 study about gay male victims of domestic
violence considered the cyclic nature of violence and found that
many victims stay because of the “violence-free time frame” in
that cycle, which often works to reinforce the victim’s feelings of
love towards their abusive partner.97 However, the same study
also found that many gay victims of domestic violence chose to
stay in their relationship because they are trapped, often because
of financial dependence.98 In another 2003 study that focused on
female victims of violence, and which permitted respondents to
give multiple reasons for staying with their abusers, 53.8 percent
of those who stayed did so in part because they loved their
partner.99 Yet, sizeable portions of these respondents also
indicated that they stayed because they were trapped; more
specifically, 45.9 percent remarked that they stayed in part
because of a lack of money, 36.7 percent stayed because they were
afraid of their partner, and 28.5 percent stayed because they had
nowhere else to go.100 So while this study noted that love was one
reason victims of violence stayed, the study also found that those
feelings of love often intersected with feelings of being trapped.101
In sum, while some sources acknowledge that many
victims of domestic violence want, rather than need or are
forced, to maintain their intimate relationships, few explicitly
legitimize victim reasoning. When they do, they qualify the
legitimacy with the explanation that victims also are entrapped.

Id. at 11.
J. Michael Cruz, “Why Doesn’t He Just Leave?” Gay Male Domestic Violence and
the Reasons Victims Stay, 11 J. OF MEN’S STUD. 309, 316–17 (2003) (“James (34) also said, ‘I
stayed in it because . . . I mean I loved him. I love him. I don’t love him today, I just won’t take
any of that crap.’ John (25) in addition to talking about his lack of experience with gay
relationships also said that he stayed with his partner because ‘ . . . just the fact that I think I
was really and truly in love with him.’ Last, Mike (31) said, ‘Because I thought I was really in
love with the person,’ while Rob (30) stated plainly, ‘I loved him.’”).
98 Id. at 310.
99 Michael A. Anderson et al., “Why Doesn’t She Just Leave?”: A Descriptive Study
of Victim Reported Impediments to Her Safety, 18 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 151, 154–55 (2003).
100 Id. at 154.
101 Id.
96
97
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III.

PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT CONSTRUCT AND
MESSAGING

A.

Not All Domestic Violence is Motivated by Power and
Control

For more than two decades, social scientists in the field of
intimate partner violence have demonstrated that there are distinct
typologies of violence that occur within intimate relationships, only
one of which involves the motive to exert power and control.102 In
particular, sociologist Michael Johnson argues that there are four
main types of relationship violence, yet only one of these types is
prompted by an abuser’s desire to control and coerce the victim.103
Starting with Johnson’s typologies that do not involve power
and control, he describes “[s]ituational [c]ouple [v]iolence” as
“partner violence that does not have its basis in the dynamic of
power and control.”104 It is the most common type of violence in
intimate relationships.105 “Separation-[i]nstigated [v]iolence” is a
type of partner violence that first occurs in the relationship at
separation, related to the tensions and emotions that arise in that
context but is not ongoing.106 “Violent resistance” is violence that
both men and women use in reaction to partners who have a pattern
of coercive controlling violence, for the purposes of getting the latter
to stop, or to stand up for themselves.107
According to Johnson, “[c]oercively [c]ontrolling [v]iolence” is
“a pattern of emotionally abusive intimidation, coercion, and control
coupled with physical violence against partners.”108 It is this type of
violence that anti-domestic violence activists and advocates refer to
when they use the term “domestic violence.”109 It is “the attempt to
dominate one’s partner and to exert general control over the

102 In addition to Michael Johnson and Evan Stark, discussed extensively in this
section, see PENCE & DASGUPTA, supra note 4, at 5–14 (arguing that there are five categories
of domestic violence: battering, resistive/reactive violence, situational violence, pathological
violence, and anti-social violence).
103 See Kelly & Johnson, supra note 53, at 477 (elaborating findings of MICHAEL
P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE TERRORISM, VIOLENT
RESISTANCE AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE (2008)).
104 See id. at 479.
105 Michael P. Johnson et al., Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence
in General Surveys: Ex-Spouses Required, 20 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 186, 192 (2014).
106 See Kelly & Johnson, supra note 53, at 487.
107 Id. at 484.
108 Id. at 478. In Johnson’s earlier work he called this type of violence “[i]ntimate
[partner] [t]errorism” but modified it because of resistance in the field. Id. at 478–79.
109 Id. at 478.
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relationship, domination that is manifested in the use of a wide
range of power and control tactics, including violence.”110
Sociologist Evan Stark also uses the term “coercive control”
and (literally) wrote the book on it.111 Though he uses different terms
to describe other forms of violence in intimate partnerships—Stark
uses “fights,” “assaults,” and “coercive control”—he largely agrees
with Johnson’s typologies,112 and argues for one additional nuance.
Stark argues that Johnson’s “situational violence” does not
sufficiently distinguish between the “ordinary fights that many
couples view as legitimate ways to settle their differences, and frank
assaults where violence is used to hurt, frighten, or subordinate a
partner, but control tactics are not.”113
What both leading sociologists also agree upon is that
coercive control, the type of violence that anti-domestic violence
activists simply call “domestic violence,” is gendered. In
heterosexual relationships, men are the primary perpetrators and
women the victims.114
This conclusion has not been consistently replicated,
however. Some data indicate that women use coercively
controlling violence in heterosexual intimate relationships.115
Moreover, Johnson’s typologies do not account for sexual
violence in relationships.116 In a meta-review of the empirical
data between 2002 and 2013, Hamberger and Larson found that
both men and women are active participants in physical and
emotional violence, and that both the purpose for and effect of
the abuse was gendered.117 For example, women’s use of physical
violence was in response to violence used against them by men.
Men’s use of emotional abuse tactics tended to threaten women’s
110 Michael P. Johnson & Janel M. Leone, The Differential Effects of Intimate
Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence: Findings from the National Violence Against
Women Survey, 26 J. FAM. ISSUES 322, 323 (2005).
111 EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL
LIFE 4 (2007). The term was coined by Susan Schechter. SUSAN SCHECHTER, GUIDELINES FOR
MENTAL HEALTH PRACTITIONERS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 4 (1987).
112 See STARK, supra note 111, at 104 (“Johnson crystallized observations I and
others had been making since the early 1980s.”).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 102 (“[T]he pattern of intimidation, isolation, and control . . . is unique to
men’s abuse of women and . . . is critical to explaining why women become entrapped in abusive
relationships in ways that men do not and experience abuse as ongoing. These tactics do not
typify all forms of abuse.”); see also Kelly & Johnson, supra note 53, at 482 (discussing the results
of various surveys and stating that coercively controlling violence is largely male perpetrated).
115 See Hines & Douglas, supra note 16.
116 Eryn Nicole O’Neal et al., When the Bedroom is the Crime Scene: To What
Extent Does Johnson’s Typology Account for Intimate Partner Sexual Assault?, 11 J.
CHILD CUSTODY 278, 297 (2014).
117 Kevin L. Hamberger & Sadie E. Larson, Men’s and Women’s Experience of
Intimate Partner Violence: A Review of Ten Years of Comparative Studies in Clinical
Samples: Part I, 30 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 699, 717 (2015).
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safety and autonomy, whereas women’s abuse tactics did not.
Men were the primary perpetrators of sexual violence. Women
were more highly victimized and fearful than men.118
Johnsons’s and Stark’s works have generated numerous
empirical studies aimed at discerning and measuring the
distinct typologies of violence that occur between intimate
partners.119 This body of work, which includes more than seventy
articles,120 demonstrates empirically what sociologists Johnson
and Stark proposed theoretically: that violence between
intimate partners is “not a unitary phenomenon and that there
are different types of [intimate partner violence] with different
etiologies and outcomes.”121 Some argue there is “a continuum of
violence experience” in relationships.122 Understanding a
particular perpetrator’s intent in using violence and the impact
that violence has on the person experiencing it are critical.123
As a result, Kelly and Johnson conclude, “it is no longer
considered scientifically or ethically acceptable to speak of domestic
violence without specifying the type of partner violence to which
one refers.”124
B.

Not All People Subjected to Abuse Become Entrapped

Overestimations of the prevalence of coercively controlling
violence—the type that most anti-domestic advocates and the
Id. at 715.
See infra Section IV.C. For a recent review of this literature, and cautions about
its use by courts in child custody cases, see generally Joan S. Meier, Dangerous Liaisons: A
Domestic Violence Typology in Custody Litigation, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 115 (2017).
120 See Meier, supra note 119, at 132.
121 Connie J. A. Beck & Chitra Raghavan, Intimate Partner Abuse Screening in
Custody Mediation: The Importance of Assessing Coercive Control, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 555,
555 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
122 Pauline Gulliver & Janet L. Fanslow, The Johnson Typologies of Intimate
Partner Violence: An Investigation of Their Representation in a General Population of New
Zealand Women, 12 J. CHILD CUSTODY 25, 40 (2015); see also Victoria Frye et al., The
Distribution of and Factors Associated With Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple
Violence Among a Population-Based Sample of Urban Women in the United States, 21 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1286, 1303 (2006); Connie J. A. Beck et al., Patterns of Intimate
Partner Violence in a Large, Epidemiological Sample of Divorcing Couples, 27 J. FAM.
PSYCHOL. 743, 750 (2013).
123 See STARK, supra note 111, at 205 (describing the importance of the intent
of the perpetrator to dominate and control his or her partner; if a specific assault is part
of a larger pattern of ongoing tactics used coercively to control another, it tips into the
realm of abusive); see also PENCE & DASGUPTA, supra note 4, at 15–16 (arguing “as
communities across the country continue to grapple with complexities of intimate
partner abuse, we revisit the fundamental question, ‘who is doing what to whom and
with what impact?’”); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 56 (1991) (describing “battering as a (violent)
point on a continuum of domination in relationships,” she argues that the intent of the
perpetrator should be the focus).
124 See Kelly & Johnson, supra note 53, at 477.
118
119
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public simply call “domestic violence”—have serious and
deleterious consequences. It is coercively controlling violence, and
not other types of violence, that sociologists tell us entrap women
in their daily lives.125 Entrapment is at the heart of what antidomestic violence advocates most want to prevent.126 Entrapment
occurs when men use the behaviors captured on the Power and
Control Wheel (e.g., economic abuse, isolation, emotional abuse,
etc.) against women in a sexist society.127
For social scientists such as Stark, entrapment is a term of
art. It is the confluence of societal institutions that supports male
privilege, sexism, and an individual man who uses coercively
controlling tactics. Entrapment is “the unique experiential effect
when structural exploitation, regulation, and other controls are
personalized.”128
For the public, entrapment means something different. It
connotes the images that Loseke first described, and that persist
today: those of the individual woman who is frozen, paralyzed, and
helpless who, if given the resources, whether financial, legal, or
emotional, would leave her partner if only she could.129 Analysis of
structural sexism is lost in this equation, for the equation assumes
that a one-time bail out will equalize her access to resources and
power generally. But this is not the case. “Men and women are
unequal in battering not because they are unequal in their
capacities for violence but because sexual discrimination allows
men privileged access to the material and social resources needed
to gain advantage in power struggles.”130 We believe that police,
judges, lawyers, advocates, social workers, friends, neighbors, and
family can provide the necessary support, resources, and
strength.131 They can help “entrapped” women by helping them
leave. Helping individual women leave, then, has been and
continues to be the solution. When women choose not to leave, they,
rather than the phenomenon of entrapment, are to blame.132
I have previously argued that feminist legal scholars
have made the mistake of underrepresenting the empirical
See STARK, supra note 111, at 129–30.
See supra Section II.C.
127 See STARK, supra note 111, at 129–30.
128 Id. at 370.
129 See supra Section II.C.
130 See STARK, supra note 111, at 105.
131 See GOODMARK, supra note 8, at 81 (describing in detail the conflation of
“separation with successful termination of the violence” as having “oriented domestic
violence law and policy since the early days of the battered women’s movement” and
arguing how law and policy development within the legal system unequivocally
prioritizes separation as the only clear remedy to ending domestic violence).
132 Id. at 66–69 (describing skepticism of professionals when women do not act
in conformity with stereotypes of victims as passive and desirous of leaving).
125
126
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complexities of domestic violence.133 We assume, when we write
broadly about “intimate partner violence,” that we are all on the
same page about what this term means.134 Like anti-domestic
violence activists and advocates, scholars usually mean coercive
control; the statistics we cite, however, are about all forms of
violence between partners, as Stark, Johnson, and others have
set them out. We commonly cite large scale, national studies that
fail to distinguish between the incidence and prevalence of
intimate partner violence, and then we use these studies to
discuss both incidence and prevalence indiscriminately.135 For
example, based on the National Violence Against Women
Survey, I mistakenly argued that “[t]he vast majority of
[domestic violence] victims do not report the violence to the
police” without differentiating amongst types of violence.136 In
fact, victims of coercive control versus victims of any other type
of intimate partner violence are more likely to call the police.137
Another problem with generalizing from a subset is that we
overstate the problem of entrapment. Entrapment is a
phenomenon unique to the subset of domestic violence that is about
power and control, or coercive control.138 Entrapment does not
occur, for example, in the type of intimate partner violence that
Kelly and Johnson label “[v]iolent [r]esistance.”139 Nor does it occur
in situational couple violence—the most widespread type of
intimate partner violence.140 Nor does it occur in the type of
intimate partner violence that Stark labels “fights.”141
In short, by generalizing from a particular subset of
violence in intimate relationships, we imply that all women who
experience any form of relationship violence are coercively
controlled and that all women who experience any form of
See Kuennen, supra note 19, at 1007.
Id. at 1008.
135 Id.
136 Tamara L. Kuennen, Recognizing the Right to Petition for Victims of
Domestic Violence, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 839 (2012).
137 Janel M. Leone et al., Women’s Decisions to Not Seek Formal Help for Partner
Violence: A Comparison of Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence, 29 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1850, 1862 (2014) (finding that “70.2% of intimate terrorism victims
sought some type of formal help versus 44.4% of situational couple violence victims”).
138 See STARK, supra note 111, at 105–06 (explaining the co-occurrence of entrapment
and coercive control).
139 See Kelly & Johnson, supra note 53, at 479 (describing violent resistance as
an act of violence in reaction to the partner’s use of coercive control, rather than as an
act that is motivated by the desire to control, or entrap, the partner).
140 See id. (defining situational violence as having no basis in the motive of
power and control); id. at 481 (stating that situational violence is far more common than
coercively controlling violence).
141 See STARK supra note 111, at 105–06 (explaining that entrapment when one
party is successful in their efforts to control the other, and distinguishing that context
from ordinary “fights” in intimate partnerships).
133
134
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relationship violence are entrapped.142 Because entrapment means
something different to the general public than to the social
scientists who coined the term, our overstatements contribute to,
and perhaps even reproduce, the very images of women
experiencing relationship violence that we most want to change.143
C.

A Clearer Construct

Loseke claimed that in the social problems industry,
claims-makers use extreme examples and images, and that the
use of extremes is understandable, perhaps even necessary, in
the process of putting a social problem on the public’s radar.144
She observed, however, that to maintain integrity, the use of
extremes must be acknowledged by those who use them.145
Today’s anti-domestic violence activists know that there
are many types of violence, and that domestic violence is not
limited to a pattern of behaviors perpetrated for the purpose of
power and control.146 One need not look further for evidence of this
than to look at the explanations we offer to justify women’s use of
violence against male intimate partners. When heterosexual
women commit violence against their partners, we justify its use
on numerous grounds: self-defense; provoking an attack to get it
over with; sending a clear message that a partner’s ongoing abuse
will no longer be tolerated; and leveling the power imbalance, to
name but a few.147
I do not take issue with such justifications, many of which
provide nuanced, contextualized depth that foster our
understanding of the dynamics of the particular intimate

See discussion supra Section II.C.
See discussion supra Part I.
144 See Lived Realities, supra note 9, at 239.
145 Id. (“I am not arguing that the extreme acts advanced in such social problem official
definitions are absent from social life . . . . I am arguing only the obvious: Cases used to illustrate
and define social problems are selected from the larger populations of potentially similar cases.”).
146 See PENCE & DASGUPTA, supra note 4.
147 See, e.g., Shamita Das Dasgupta, A Framework for Understanding Women’s Use of
Nonlethal Violence in Intimate Heterosexual Relationships, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1364,
1378 (2002); Lisa Young Larance, When She Hits Him: Why the Institutional Response Deserves
Reconsideration, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN NEWSL. 10, 14 (2007); Martha McMahon & Ellen
Pence, Making Social Change: Reflections on Individual and Institutional Advocacy with
Women Arrested for Domestic Violence, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 47, 51–52 (2003); see also
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 114 (2000) (“The goal of
this work has been to expand defense options in order to equalize women’s rights to trial and
afford women equal opportunity to present an effective defense. It has not rested on the claim
that all battered women are entitled to self-defense, or that there should be a special defense for
battered women, either as self-defense or as a special ‘battered woman defense.’ To the contrary,
the argument is that battered women, like all criminal defendants, have to be included within
the traditional framework of the criminal law in order to guarantee their equal rights to trial.”).
142
143
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relationship within which violence occurs.148 Rather, I point out that
in many contexts, activists have already made the case that some
relationship violence is not “domestic violence,” as constructed by the
Power and Control Wheel and broadcast by anti-domestic violence
organizations.149
Political scientist Kristen Bumiller recently observed
about the Duluth model that generated the Power and Control
Wheel:
The study of domestic violence policy was and continues to be
profoundly influenced by early activists’ conception of the problem.
Most activists portrayed fundamentally important theoretical and
empirical issues as settled, and the Duluth Model has had a strong
hold on the field. This uniform understanding of the problem and its
solution likely contributed to the failure of the movement to develop a
multifaceted picture of domestic violence and a tendency to
underrepresent the empirical complexities of domestic violence
situations.150

Ellen Pence, one of the co-founders of the Duluth Abuse
Intervention Project that produced the Power and Control Wheel,
acknowledged precisely this. In an almost uncited article written
in 2006, Re-Examining ‘Battering’: Are All Acts of Violence Against
Intimate Partners the Same?, Pence argued that there are at least
five different categories of domestic violence.151 But, she argued,
domestic violence has become conflated with “any violence between
partners occurring in the context of the home” rather than what it
was intended by activists to mean: “a pattern of coercive control,
intimidation, and oppression” that “could include physical and
sexual abuses.”152 By arguing that there are distinct categories of
domestic violence, Pence and her co-author Shamita Das Dasupta
clarified that they, as “Duluth advocates,” had not discarded the
centrality of power and control from their theory of male violence
against women, but rather intended to address “the fact that not

148 Many justifications such as these explain “the gendered nature of violence
and the meaning of pursuing equality in social contexts in which people are clearly not
equal in power or social resources.” See McMahon & Pence, supra note 147, at 71. For a
comprehensive explanation of analyzing women’s use of violence within an equality
framework, see SCHNEIDER, supra note 147, at 113–25.
149 See McMahon & Pence, supra note 147, at 49–52.
150 Kristin Bumiller, The Nexus of Domestic Violence Reform and Social Science:
From Instrument of Social Change to Institutionalized Surveillance, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 173, 175 (2010).
151 See PENCE & DASGUPTA, supra note 4, at 5–14 (arguing that the types included:
battering, resistive/reactive violence, situational violence, pathological violence, and antisocial violence).
152 Id. at 2.
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every act of domestic violence, violence that is perpetrated within
the home, is battering.”153
My argument is that we (activists) would be better served by
being explicit about these complexities, and that we do so not merely
in defense of women perpetrators. The current messaging, described
supra Part II, fails to acknowledge that there are multiple types of
violence in relationships. In fact, it implies that there is only one
type, the type that Pence calls “battering” and social scientists call
“coercive control.”
Anti-domestic violence advocates’ specific message
should be that while we take all violence in relationships
seriously, we target the subset of relationship violence used by
one person to gain power and control over another. Specifically,
we believe that the intent of the person defines what is or is not
“domestic violence” and that a pattern of behaviors, rather than
a one-off incident of violence, demonstrates this intent.154
When we speak of changing the norm of the acceptability
of gender-based violence, we are not talking about eradicating
fights in intimate relationships—even those fights that become
physical. What we seek to end is the particular type of violence
based on power and control, that is perpetrated by both men and
women but that has disproportionately damaging effects on
women and other socially marginalized groups in a society that
promotes homogeneous norms regarding sex, gender, and gender
identity, to name but a few. Hence, our construct might be:
Not all violence in relationships is “domestic violence.”
Domestic violence is a pattern of behaviors used by one person
in an intimate relationship over another for the purpose of
exerting power and control over them.
Id. at 4.
Pence and Dasgupta argue that not just the perpetrator’s intent, but also the
impact on the victim, should be taken into account. The purpose of this type of differentiated
analysis “is to suggest that as communities across the country continue to grapple with
complexities of intimate partner abuse, we revisit the fundamental question, ‘who is doing what
to whom and with what impact?’ The answer to this query should inform our responses as well
as our continued refinement of social and legal public policies regarding domestic violence. For
those of us who have worked to coordinate a community response that leads to the protection of
victims of ongoing abuse, our current challenge is to address these differences and incorporate
them in our interventions.” Id. at 15–16. Others agree that the critical question involves
analyzing the effect of the abuse on the victim. See, e.g., Loretta Frederick, Questions About
Family Court Domestic Violence Screening and Assessment, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 523, 525 (2008)
(“Because the purpose, meaning, and effect of the violence are critical factors in determining
what interventions are most effective and protective, any screening for domestic violence should
be designed to explore all three of these aspects of the context for the violence.”); see also Gabrielle
Davis, A Systematic Approach to Domestic Abuse-Informed Child Custody Decision Making in
Family Law Cases, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 565, 569 (2015) (“[I]t is not enough for practitioners to
simply identify domestic abuse. They must delve deeper to understand the specific nature and
context of domestic abuse that is occurring in each individual case. In short, they must determine
who is doing what to whom and to what effect.”).
153
154
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This construct does not deny that women in heterosexual
and non-heterosexual relationships have the capacity to use, and
do use, many forms of violence, including coercive control.155 Denial
and minimization of women’s use of violence in relationships has
been a longstanding critique of the construct.156 A more discerning
construct would, without denying women’s capacity and power,
nonetheless target the type of abuse that is supported by sexist
institutions and culture. And as argued below, being explicit about
what domestic violence is not would advance the effectiveness of
law as a vehicle for social change.
IV.

CONSTRUCTS AND LAW

Sociologist Loseke argued that the specific content of
constructs “furnish[ed] warrants for a particular type of social
service—shelters for the battered woman.”157 While shelters still
exist, today’s primary service provider for victims is the criminal
legal system.158
A.

Criminal Law

With rare exceptions, the legal system’s solution to the
problem of domestic violence is to physically separate the
perpetrator and victim.159 This occurs through a host of
interventions, including mandatory arrest at the scene of a domestic
disturbance, aggressive prosecution of domestic violence cases, and
the widespread issuance of restraining orders preventing
perpetrators from contacting victims.160
If domestic violence, as constructed, is a pattern of acts in
which the perpetrator dominates and controls their partner, and
See supra Section III.A.
See, e.g., STARK, supra note 111, at 92 (observing “feminist-oriented researchers[‘]”
discomfort in recognizing that “large numbers of women use force in relationships, including the
types of force classified as severe or abusive” but noting that this is “incontrovertible” and is a
reality that must be acknowledged); see also Kelly & Johnson, supra note 53, at 479 (criticizing
women’s advocates for their reluctance to accept the fact that many women use violence in
relationships that are not violent); id. at 482 (noting that women in heterosexual relationships
use coercive control in particular).
157 See LOSEKE, supra note 9, at 3.
158 LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1 (2018) [hereinafter
GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING] (“For the last thirty years, the United States has relied
primarily on one tool to combat intimate partner violence—the criminal legal system.”); see
also GOODMARK, supra note 8, at 18.
159 Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 Yale L.J. 2, 10 (2006) (“In this
[criminal justice] system, the government (rather than one of the parties) initiates and
dictates the end of the intimate relationship as a solution to [domestic violence].”).
160 These interventions are the subject of a deep well of feminist legal
scholarship. For the most recent discussion of the current criminal justice regime and its
history, see GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING, supra note 158, at 12–34.
155
156

2020]

"DOMESTIC VIOLENCE"

71

the victim is entrapped, a legal regime that removes and keeps
away the perpetrator makes sense. Mandatory arrest, aggressive
prosecution, and mandatory criminal protection orders are all
interventions that physically remove the perpetrator from the
victim. They simultaneously provide a solution to both the
continued exertion of power and control, and entrapment, at least
in the short-term if not indefinitely. As such, these remedies are
justified by current constructs.161
But what about the many varieties of relationship
violence that are far more common, such as situational violence,
that have nothing to do with power and control?
There is a mismatch between the conduct for which
offenders are arrested, restrained, and prosecuted, and the
current construct of domestic violence. The federal Violence
Against Women Act defines domestic violence as any “felony or
misdemeanor crime” perpetrated by one person against another
in an intimate or familial relationship.162 The felony or
misdemeanor is set forth in states’ criminal codes.163
No state statute criminalizes a “pattern of behavior for the
purpose of gaining power and control” in a relationship. Indeed, few
states have codified a standalone offense of “domestic violence.”
Instead, states label, categorize, or enhance the penalties for
numerous crimes such as assault, battery, and kidnapping in one
circumstance: when perpetrated in a relationship.164 Few state
See Bumiller, supra note 150 (“The fundamental presumption [of the Power
and Control Wheel)] was that legal deterrents were always the appropriate response to
violence in the home. The model emphasized the need for consistency in police and
administrative response to incidents of domestic abuse. This laid the foundation for the
advocacy of mandatory arrest policies.”).
162 34 U.S.C. § 12291(a)(8) (“The term ‘domestic violence’ includes felony or
misdemeanor crimes of violence committed by a current or former spouse or intimate
partner of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a
person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the victim as a spouse or
intimate partner, by a person similarly situated to a spouse of the victim under the
domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction receiving grant monies, or by any
other person against an adult or youth victim who is protected from that person’s acts
under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction.”).
163 Id.
164 See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-130 to -138; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3601(A), 3601.02; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-26-303 to -309; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-23(f); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 709-906(1); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-918; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-3.2 to -3.3;
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-31.5-2-76; IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.2A; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5414; KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.032; LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:35.3, :37.7; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 207-A, 209-A, 210-B, 210-C, 211-A; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.81(2); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 609.2242, .2247; MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 97-3-7(3)(a), 99-3-7(5); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 565.072 to
.076; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-323; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 33.018, 200.485; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:2-b; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19; N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 30-3-12 to -16; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 644; 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-29-2; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-25-20, -65;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-111; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-1(4); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1042;
161
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statutes mention, let alone require proof of, any motive.165 Nor does
any state statute require that criminal acts of violence within an
intimate relationship be part of a pattern, though repeated acts
against the same partner might warrant enhanced penalties.166
Thus any single criminal act committed by one partner
against another, for any reason, can qualify as a crime subjecting the
perpetrator to mandatory arrest, aggressive prosecution, and
restraint. This treatment bears little resemblance to the
predominant construct of domestic violence, which requires a
pattern and a motive. An unintended consequence of this mismatch
is that it detracts from our collective ability to target for punishment
and moral condemnation the pattern of acts, both physical and
nonphysical, aimed at diminishing the autonomy of a partner.
B.

Legal Decision Makers’ Application of Construct

Loseke argued that shelter workers weeded out applicants
for their services by applying the constructs of “wife abuse” and
“battered women.”167 If the violence was not severe, escalating and
unstoppable, or the woman was not desirous of escaping her
entrapment, she was denied entry to the shelter.168 Women who
reported violence, but not severe violence, were denied entry. So
too were women who were complicit in the violence, such as by
provoking it or striking back.169 Consequently, women who
experienced “ordinary violence” or who did not want to end their
relationships did not become members of the social community of
battered women.170
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.020(6); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-228; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.075; WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-510 to -511.
165 No state statute mentions “power and control,” but some mention “coercion”
and “control.” See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-800.3 (defining domestic violence
for the purposes of sentence enhancement as “an act or threatened act of violence upon
a person with whom the actor is or has been involved in an intimate relationship,” and
as “any other crime against a person . . . when used as a method of coercion, control,
punishment, intimidation, or revenge directed against a person with whom the actor is
or has been involved in an intimate relationship”).
166 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-23.1; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-2-1.3(c)(4) (noting that
“domestic battery” is a Class A misdemeanor, but the crime becomes a Level 5 felony if the
person has a previous conviction for a battery offense against the same family or household
member); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.81; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-17.
167 See LOSEKE, supra note 9, at 71–94.
168 Id. at 76–77 (discussing how important it is, in the minds of shelter workers,
that a woman be a “battered woman” and that women “want to make a break from their
husbands” to gain entry into the shelter).
169 Id. at 44–45 (discussing how, to be worthy of public attention and sympathy,
battering must be extreme and a battered woman must leave her batterer or be
considered “complicit in creating her troubles”).
170 Id. at 4 (describing the worker activity of selecting some clients for shelter
but not others as “the social problems work of allowing only some women to become
official members of the battered woman social collectivity”).

2020]

"DOMESTIC VIOLENCE"

73

Today, as states continue to cut funding for social services
but criminal justice dollars abound, police, prosecutors, judges,
and jurors decide who will be included or excluded in the
community of domestic violence victims.171 Loseke’s lesson is that
the mismatch between law and construct, albeit unwitting,
causes them to exclude real victims of domestic violence, and to
include only constructed victims.
Dan Kahan, a professor of law and of psychology at Yale
Law School and whose work in the area of social norm change is
widely cited, argued that when legal decision makers feel that laws
are too condemnatory, they refuse to enforce them.172 Specifically,
“When states enact mandatory arrest policies, police departments
refuse to implement them. When states raise the penalties for
repeat offenders, prosecutors drop cases, juries acquit, and judges
refuse to sentence severely. When judges make nonabuse a
condition of probation, probation officers look the other way.”173
Kahan argued that a much milder law (a “gentle nudge”)
rather than a severely condemnatory one (a “hard shove”) would
better effect change of a widespread social norm.174 He argued that
in the field of domestic violence, “legislative reforms reflected strong,
feminist-inspired critiques of norms that had not yet been fully
repudiated by society at large.”175 Consequently, these laws are
underenforced and do not create the norm change that reformers
desired. Indeed, a number of feminist legal scholars lament that the
criminal justice regime has fallen far short of achieving any real
change in attitudes or norms about relationship violence.176
Kahan’s particular concern is the “sticky norms problem,”
which occurs when the prevalence of a social norm makes decision
makers reluctant to carry out a law intended to change that
norm.177 Law on the books reflects a zero tolerance attitude toward

171 See GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING, supra note 158, at 2–3 (discussing
disparity in funding for criminal justice interventions versus social services).
172 Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 609–10 (2000).
173 Id. at 628.
174 Id. at 610–11 (describing how, as the severity of punishment too significantly
outweighs the severity of the wrong, judges will refuse to enforce the law, citizens will
notice the under-enforcement and therefore not heed the law; thus a less drastic approach,
or gentle nudge versus hard shove, makes more sense on the path to social change).
175 Id. at 629.
176 See GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING, supra note 158, at 8 (“Criminalization does
little to prevent intimate partner violence . . . . and exacerbates the conditions that contribute
to intimate partner violence.”); see also id. at 18–22; Weissman, supra note 12, at 1481
(arguing that anti-domestic violence movement has too closely aligned itself with the criminal
justice system and its narrative of victimhood to effect the social change it sought);
SCHNEIDER, supra note 147, at 29–56.
177 See Kahan, supra note 172, at 607.
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violence in intimate relationships.178 A zero tolerance attitude does
not match the current construct of domestic violence.179 Decision
makers are willing to buy the construct, that domestic violence is
about power and control and should be prosecuted, but they are not
willing to buy that every act of violence in relationships amounts
to a pattern of acts based on power and control.180 Nor should they.
This is why the messaging must be explicit: not all relationship
violence is domestic violence, as constructed.
Thus the desire of activists to change the norm of violence
against women may be thwarted by the very thing that was
necessary to make it visible to begin with: the notion that
relationship violence is always extreme or outside of the bell curve
of the “normal violence and coercion” that exists in many intimate
relationships. As a result, laws designed to change the cultural
acceptability of violence against women have had less effect than
they might otherwise have.
C.

Proposed “Gentler Nudges” in Law

A number of feminist legal scholars have applied Kahan’s
gentle nudge theory in the context of intimate relationship
violence.181 One of the most disarming, yet commonsensical,
applications is that of Katherine Baker in the context of
prosecuting rape. She argues that because the norm of rape and
myths about gender and sex roles that support rape are deeply
entrenched, only those rape cases that involve physical force should
See discussion supra Section IV.A.
See discussion supra Section II.A.
180 See discussion supra Section IV.B.
181 See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law, 98
MINN. L. REV. 1453, 1507–08, 1510 (2014) (arguing that “[r]ape law reform can only be
effective if it bears a close connection to social norms” and that, based on Kahan’s
scholarship, radical reforms of rape law are largely ineffective); Deborah L. Brake, Fighting
the Rape Culture Wars Through the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard, 78 MONT. L.
REV. 109, 143 (2017) (“As scholars have pointed out in relation to the criminal law of rape,
law reforms that harshly punish conduct that is commonplace and within the range of
widely shared social norms (including male pursuit of sex in circumstances which many
men would perceive as implying consent) risk provoking backlash instead of shifting
norms.”); Erin Collins, The Criminalization of Title IX, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 365, 370,
388–89 (2016) (using nudge theory to explain why the drastic rape and domestic violence
legal reforms of the 1980s did not lead to corresponding “behavioral, institutional, [or]
cultural changes” and noting that “it is increasingly acknowledged that changes to criminal
justice law and policy have had limited impact on behaviors and attitudes about sexual
assault”); Carolyn B. Ramsey, Firearms in the Family, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1257, 1342 (2017)
(“[A] ‘gentle nudge’ in the domestic violence context could occur outside the realm of statute
(for example, educating judges, prosecutors, police, and victims about the homicide risks
posed by batterers’ access to firearms).”); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State:
The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1698 (2004)
(using nudge theory to help explain why domestic violence legal reforms have not been fully
instituted by decision makers like police, prosecutors, and judges).
178
179
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be criminally prosecuted.182 Baker’s reasoning is that it is easier for
the average juror to convict when physical force is involved because
of the widespread acceptance of the immorality of physically forced
rape, versus date or acquaintance rape where consent is unclear:
When a stranger with a weapon attacks a woman on a dark night and
has intercourse with her, that is rape and everyone knows it. But
when an acquaintance has sex with a woman who invited him into her
house, many people are confused about whether that event could be
rape. In neither situation do people doubt the biological fact that
intercourse took place, but people are not sure whether the latter
situation is rape as they have been taught to define it.183

Baker of course does not argue that date or acquaintance
rape go unpunished. Rather, she argues that cases involving a
question of whether the victim consented should be treated more
analogously to Title IX cases on college campuses.184
Neither Deborah Tuerkheimer185 nor David Zlotnick186
cites to Kahan’s gentle nudge theory explicitly, but both draw on
its principles in the context of domestic violence law and policy
reform.187 Tuerkheimer argued for reform of the substantive
crime of domestic violence. Rather than focus on a discrete,
physical assault, prosecution should target two or more acts
perpetrated with the intent to exert power or control over the
other within an intimate or family relationship.188 Reform of the
criminal law in this manner fits precisely the social construct of
domestic violence as anti-domestic violence activists and
advocates envision it. The prosecution of domestic violence is not
182 Katherine Baker, Why Rape Should Not Always be a Crime, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 221, 221–25 (2015) (arguing for gender discrimination rather than rape finding in
Title IX claims of sexual assault on campuses because neither men, women, nor society
view much of what the criminal law calls “rape” as rape).
183 Katharine K. Baker, What Rape Is and What It Ought Not to Be, 39 JURIMETRICS
233, 236–37 (1999).
184 See Baker, supra note 182, at 224.
185 See generally Tuerkheimer, supra note 8, at 1028.
186 See generally David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use
of Criminal Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
1153, 1153–54 (1995).
187 For example, Zlotnick argues that his proposal is counter to that of “pure
criminalization advocates [who] are too far ahead of current cultural values. Given the
high level of violence in our society, and especially in some communities, juries resist
branding an individual a criminal when there is no act of violence, as in the violation of
a stay-away order. Therefore, this attempt to transform public opinion through labeling
all acts associated with a domestic violence as criminal simply goes too far.” Id. at 1212.
188 Specifically, her proposed “battering” legislation, within an intimate or
household relationship would hold a person guilty of “battering when: [h]e or she
intentionally engages in a course of conduct directed at a family or household member;
and [h]e or she knows or reasonably should know that such conduct is likely to result in
substantial power or control over the family or household member; and [a]t least two
acts comprising the course of conduct constitute a crime in this jurisdiction.” See
Tuerkheimer, supra note 8, at 1019–20.
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“zero tolerance” of any relationship violence, but rather targets
what social scientists call “coercive control,”189 creators of the
Power and Control Wheel call “battering,”190 and current antidomestic violence activists simply call “domestic violence.”
To ensure it fits the transparent, explicit construct I have
set forth, to Tuerkheimer’s proposal one might explicitly add that
other crimes occurring in intimate or family relationships not be
categorized in any manner, from charging to sentencing, as
“domestic violence.” Consequently, a physical assault committed
by one partner against another would not be charged as a
“domestic violence” crime. No-drop prosecution policies would not
apply. A criminal protection order would not automatically issue.
Neither federal gun prohibitions nor enhanced sentencing would
apply. But a pattern of behaviors—including but not limited to
physical violence—perpetrated for the purpose of power and
control would continue to be prosecuted with the full force, and
with all of the attendant federal and state law protections and
procedures, that the current legal regime provides to any crime
committed by an intimate partner, even when these lack a
pattern or a motive.
One potential critique of a transparent construct that
embraces a discerning approach to domestic violence is that
different typologies of violence overlap, and so it is not always
easy at a given point in time in a relationship to discern who is
doing what to whom, and with what intent or impact.191 For
example, at the same time that one partner is engaged in
coercively controlling violence, the other, in anticipation of it, may
be engaged in violent resistance. Or an incident that looks to be
situational at first blush may, in fact, be the start of a pattern of
coercive control.192 A related critique is that, even if the violence
is not coercively controlling violence but is merely situational, a
severe incident of situational violence can nonetheless put the
victim at risk of serious, if not fatal, injury.193 Yet another critique

See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section III.C.
191 See Gulliver & Fanslow, supra note 122.
192 See generally Joan S. Meier, Johnson’s Differentiation Theory: Is It Really
Empirically Supported?, 12 J. CHILD CUSTODY 4 (2015) (arguing that Michael Johnson’s
typologies of domestic violence, when applied in the context of family law and particularly child
custody decisions, have had a detrimental effect on mothers who claim that fathers are abusive).
193 See Meier, supra note 119, at 149 (“[T]he research diverges from the typology’s
construct of two primary and distinct types of domestic violence, one of which is relatively
more severe and dangerous, and the other of which is not. A fair quantity of research suggests
instead that coercive control, severe violence, and fear are each profoundly harmful, and that
severe violence and fear may occur without relationship-wide coercive control. If
dangerousness and harmfulness cut across both [situational couple violence] and [intimate
189
190
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is that research regarding typologies is still in its infancy,
relatively speaking, and that the reliability of differentiated
typologies as a whole must be approached cautiously.194
For all of the above reasons, Professor Joan Meier
advocates, at least in the context of courts’ decision-making in
child custody decisions, for a better safe than sorry approach. She
argues that the “most important message that can be given to
family courts is to presume coercive control until proven
otherwise—and likewise to presume dangerousness, until proven
otherwise.”195 One of her rationales is that courts will, when in
doubt, not buck social norms but instead protect the status quo.196
In family law litigation, this means that courts will minimize the
violence, by presuming it to be situational rather than attributing
an ill motive to the father or investigating the full impact of the
violence on the mother and children.
Her point about legal decision makers, and courts
generally, maintaining the status quo is well taken. Indeed, it is
precisely the fodder for Dan Kahan’s “gentle nudge” approach to
law reform in the arena of domestic violence; legal decision makers
can be expected to balk when the laws they are asked to enforce
appear to deviate too substantially from current social norms.197 A
gentler nudge, in the family law context, is the approach advocated
by Gabrielle Davis198 and Loretta Frederick.199 They call for both
practitioners and presiding courts to make no presumption about
what type of violence is occurring but rather to investigate. Both
Davis and Frederick are staff attorneys with the Battered Women’s
Justice Project.200 They also are consulting family members with
the National Judicial Institute on Domestic Violence, which in
partnership with the Office on Violence Against Women and the
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, educates
hundreds of judges each year regarding how to fact-find and make

terrorism and coercive controlling violence], then a history of [situational couple violence] can
also indicate real danger, contrary to the typology’s implications.” (emphasis in original)).
194 Id. at 120.
195 Id. at 151 (emphasis in original).
196 Id. at 120 (“When the inherent fluidity and ambiguity of such a social science
theory intersects with courts’ specific needs and agendas, it can be expected to be
deployed, as here, to further existing cultural norms or ideologies rather than to bring
improved accuracy or better outcomes.”).
197 See supra Section IV.B.
198 See Gabrielle Davis, A Systematic Approach to Domestic Abuse-Informed Child
Custody Decision Making in Family Law Cases, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 565, 567–68 (2015).
199 See Loretta Frederick, Questions About Family Court Domestic Violence
Screening and Assessment, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 523, 529–30 (2008).
200 Staff
and
Leadership,
BATTERED
WOMEN’S
JUST.
PROJECT,
https://www.bwjp.org/about-bwjp/staff-and-leadership.html [https://perma.cc/K7T7-U8PM].
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decisions in family, civil protection, and criminal proceedings
involving domestic violence.201
David Zlotnick proposed giving greater teeth to civil
protection orders by holding violators in criminal contempt as a
primary, and more effective, means of addressing domestic violence
than either mandatory arrest or no-drop prosecution policies. His
“criminal contempt sanction strategy”202 outlines a number of
distinct advantages, from a feminist perspective: it multiplies
survivors’ legal options, placing them rather than prosecutors at the
center of the decision-making process.203 It garners less resistance by
institutional actors, and by the general public, for it is a violation not
merely of an individual victim’s safety and liberty, but also of a
court’s authority.204 Contempt is a faster and easier remedy than
criminal prosecution of the underlying crime.205 Finally, contempt
empowers the people it protects because of their significant
involvement in the case and their ability to literally rename what
the perpetrator is doing as “contemptuous,” a word that commands
both lay and legal abhorrence.206
With regard to the motive of power and control, many state
civil protection laws already contemplate its importance. For
example, some states explicitly enumerate coercion or coercive acts
as grounds for obtaining a protection order.207 Others explicitly
mention the motive of control.208 Although no state requires a
petitioner to prove a pattern of acts perpetrated for the specific
purpose of gaining or maintaining power and control over another,209
201 About Us, NAT’L JUD. INST. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://www.njidv.org/aboutus.html [https://perma.cc/NBX4-6L9T].
202 See Zlotnick, supra note 186, at 1190.
203 Id. at 1197–98.
204 Id. at 1197.
205 Id. at 1196–98 (outlining the self-help procedures available in many states).
206 Zlotnick discusses at length the transformative power of language, noting
that the word contempt in its every day usage is “the act of despising,” id. at 1187, and
in its legal usage is the commission of the ultimate violation: withholding “[t]he extreme
deference [customarily] paid to the court.” Id. at 1189.
207 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (includes “[i]nterference with freedom”
under definition of abuse); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041(1) (definition of abuse includes
“[e]ngaging in a course of alarming or distressing conduct in a manner which is likely to cause
fear or emotional distress”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-101 (defining domestic abuse as
including “compelling a person by force, threat of force, or intimidation to engage in conduct from
which the person has the right or privilege to abstain, or to abstain from conduct in which the
person has a right or privilege to engage”).
208 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-100.2(2) (“[D]omestic abuse is not limited
to physical threats of violence and harm but also includes mental and emotional abuse, financial
control, document control, property control, and other types of control that make a victim more
likely to return to an abuser due to fear of retaliation or inability to meet basic needs.”).
209 See Kristy Candela, Note, Protecting the Invisible Victim: Incorporating
Coercive Control in Domestic Violence Statutes, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 112, 113 (2016) (“[N]ot
one state has encompassed the entirety of coercive control as abuse in their domestic
violence statute.”); see also Ashley Hahn, Comment, Toward a Uniform Domestic Violence
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in many states, to successfully obtain a civil protection order
requires a person to prove a pattern of acts or the likelihood that the
acts will recur as an element inherent to injunctive relief.210
In this article, I am not making the case for specific
legislation or law reform. Rather, I argue for the formulation of a
legal framework that takes into account the social construct of
domestic violence, as that construct has been laid out by antidomestic violence activists and advocates.211 One that is true to the
construct’s underlying values, neither overemphasizing a single
incident of physical violence nor underemphasizing an intentional
pattern of deprivations of liberty. This formulation must draw on
lessons, such as that in the arena of domestic violence law reform,
that demonstrate that a gentle nudge rather than a hard shove
might be more appropriate. The thrust of my argument is that a
legal approach to intimate partner abuse must be preceded by clear
constructs of the problem that are properly explained to the public.
A discerning, or differentiated, approach most closely
resembles what activists call for now. We already target what
social scientists call “coercively controlling” violence, and early
anti-domestic violence activists called “battering.”212 To make
clearer our meaning, therefore, I have advocated merely that we
be transparent and explicit about what domestic violence is not.
My argument, like that of Ellen Pence, is that our definition has
become synonymous to any act of violence in a relationship,
rather than what it was intended to be: a honing in on the
pattern of insidious acts that may, or may not, rise to the level
of physical assault but that nonetheless erode a victim’s physical

Civil Protection Order Law, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 897, 897–98 (2018) (arguing that
Congress adopt a uniform, comprehensive domestic violence civil protection order law that
includes in its definition of domestic violence forms of abuse that are not physical, such as
emotional and psychological abuse).
210 See Tamara L. Kuennen, “No-Drop” Civil Protection Orders: Exploring the
Bounds of Judicial Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 54–56 (2007) (situating civil protection order remedies within the
larger body of injunction law and practice).
211 I follow the lead of Evan Stark, who recently stated: “It’s not the law itself (a new
offense) but the constellation of factors that surround its implementation: a coherent national
strategic framework, an articulation of the current dilemma posed to the justice system by
policing domestic violence, centralized coordination by justice professionals, activist pressure
and exhibitions of political will . . . . Rather [than advocating for a new offense] I am
reiterating endorsement of the Coercive Control framework but conceived here as a
comprehensive framework for approaching partner abuse, not a specific offense. Might
include legislation but more important than the specific law is that the consensus that led to
its passage depending on a confluence of related factors that make it likely to be implemented
in ways that are consistent with the definition of the concept and its underlying value
commitments.” See Stark, supra note 17.
212 See discussion supra Section III.C (regarding the work of Ellen Pence).
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liberty and autonomy.213 If what anti-domestic violence activists
wish is for our construct of domestic violence to be distinct from,
rather than synonymous with, a single physical assault in a
relationship, we must be explicit. And, as Donileen Loseke’s
work makes clear, we must do so before we seek further reform
of policy and law.214
CONCLUSION
Of battered women’s activists in the 1970s, Loseke
observed: “Most certainly, no claims-maker argues that one act of
violence is acceptable, but it remains that in their emphases and
explicit definitions, wife abuse is about continuing, escalating,
and unstoppable victimization.”215 The same can be said of today’s
anti-domestic violence activists. One act of violence is not
acceptable. But it also is not domestic violence as we have
currently constructed it.
This article demonstrates that we, albeit unwittingly,
send the message both implicitly and explicitly that all violence
in relationships can be conceived of as one partner’s pattern of
acts designed to gain power and control over the other. Because
this is not true in a substantial number of cases, and because law,
the primary intervention designed to address domestic violence,
does not match reality, legal decision makers do not enforce
domestic violence laws.
We should be explicit that not all violence in relationships
is based on power and control, but that we emphasize that subset
of violence that is, because of the seriousness with which we take
it. It is the type of violence in intimate relationships that exploits
gender privilege and is particularly dangerous both physically
and psychologically to women and other marginalized groups.
Until we are more explicit and transparent about what domestic
violence is not, we must expect far less of the law as a tool for
social change.

213 See discussion supra Section III.C (observing that Ellen Pence, a creator of
the Power and Control Wheel, differentiated between types of violence that occur in
intimate partnerships before sociologist Michael Johnson published his now famous
writings about typologies).
214 See discussion supra Part I.
215 See LOSEKE, supra note 9, at 19 (emphases in original).

